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ABSTRACT
Using the Ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan to define the
national interest, this paper analyzes the strategic value
of the Panama Canal to the United States. The analysis is
based on a review of the historic value and cost of the
Isthmus to the power which has controlled it. This review
demonstrates that the canal is a valuable component of
U.S. Sea Power. The final chapter of this study discusses
the future of the canal. Strategic planners should assume
that the canal will be available to the United States In
wartime until the year 2000. After the year 2000, unless
the United States is able to extend its base rights in
Panama, the canal will probably not be available during
wartime, thus weakening U.S. power projection capability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will analyze the strategic value of the Panama
Canal to the United States. The influence of Alfred Thayer
Mahan (1840-191*0 will be apparent throughout this paper, not
only in the area of strategic doctrine but also in the area
of methodology. This method consists of studying the history
of Panama in order to discern general principles which may
elucidate the present and provide guidance for the future.
Drawing from this history and upon these principles, this
study puts forth the following argument: If the United States
wishes to remain a world leader, it must continue to be a
great Sea Power. In order to remain a great Sea Power, the
United States should continue its investment in the Panama
Canal. However, if its control of the canal is exercised
against the will of the Panamanian people, the United States
will incur excessive political costs. Accordingly, the opti-
mal U.S. strategy is to maintain the operation and defense of
the canal with the consent of the Panamanian people.
A. MAHANIAN STRATEGY
*
This paper relies on Mahan' s concepts of History, Sea
Power and Strategic Value in order to define the U.S. interest
in the Panama Canal. Mahan 's concept of History both defines
the nature of the global struggle in which the U.S. is engaged
and provides a method by which the U.S. can discern its role
in global affairs. The concept of Sea Power describes the
nature of U.S. national power and suggests how best this
power may be employed. Strategic Value is a tool with which
the importance of the Panama Canal may be assessed in rela-
tion to the broader concept of Sea Power.
1. History
Mahan considered himself an historian and advocated
the use of history as a guide for action. He distinguished
between using history to establish precedents versus using
it to determine principles. A "precedent" is a past decision
which is automatically applied to the present. As such, it
may be faulty or cease to apply because of changed circum-
stances. Mahan did not advocate the use of history for pre-
cedents, instead he advocated its use to determine principles.
"Principles" attempt to discern the unchanging essence of
human life and seek to elucidate the present choices. Mahan
believed that:
. . .war has such principles; their existence is detected by
the study of the past, which reveals them in successes and
failures, the same from age to age. Conditions and weapons
change; but to cope with the one or successfully wield the
others, respect must be had to these constant teachings of
history in the tactics of the battlefield, or in those wider
operations of* war which are comprised under the name of
strategy.
(Ref. l:p. 7) Mahan did not recommend blind obedience to the
past, but he did counsel respect for its experience.
In addition to viewing history as a fount of human
experience, Mahan also had a much broader concept of history.
In the broader sense, history is the "plan of Providence" or
the story of the "aggressive advance of the future upon the
present." No one human or nation controls the course of
history, yet the struggle of each actor leads toward an
"ultimate perfection of the whole." This concept of history
seems to be a blend of Christianity and Social Darwinism.
(Ref. 2:pp. 267-271)
The problem for each generation is to determine how
to progress, while maintaining the necessary continuity with
the past. Mahan emphasized the need for a nation to struggle
both for progress and for continuity—both values being higher
than the value of peace. As progress can be stifled by vio-
lent resistance, so these resistances must be overcome by
violence. For example, in the American Civil War, force was
used to overcome slavery (Ref. 3:p. 3^3). On the other hand,
some continuity with the past is necessary. Without conti-
nuity, historic change can degenerate into social convulsion
and pose a threat to the progress thusfar achieved. In such
an instance, violence must be used to curb the excesses of
progress. An example of such a convulsion is the French
Revolution where force was used to curb the radical affect of
the revolution upon the rest of Europe (Ref. 4:pp. 362-363).
Thus, Mahan' s model for history is an evolving com-
munity without a sovereign. Each nation is a part of the
world community and shares in the communal evolution generated
by the dialectic between progress and continuity. When a
member nation uses violence either to stifle progress or to
destroy continuity, the community must use violence to thwart
the harmful impulse of the recalcitrant nation. Since there
is no sovereign for the community, individual nations must
rise up to assume a position of leadership when communal
action is required. An example of such assumed leadership
is that of England during the Wars of the French Revolution.
2. Sea Power
Sea Power is the use of a nation's maritime strength
to promote its interests and to influence the course of his-
tory. According to Mahan, this maritime strength arises from
six principal conditions: (1) a nation's geographical position,
(2) the nature of its terrain, (3) the extent of its territory,
(4) the size of its population, (5) the character of its
people and (6) the character of its government (Ref. l:pp. 28-
59). All of these elements of Sea Power combine to produce
the navies and maritime commerce with which a nation is equipped.
Mahan was concerned both with how to develop such
power and with how to wield such power, i.e., the strategy of
Sea Power. Ee believed that the heart of Sea Power was its
commercial vitality. Therefore, the proper objectives of a
Sea Power strategy are: (1) to maintain its own economic
vitality by maintaining its access to maritime trade, (2) to
weaken an opponent's vitality by severing the opponent's
access to such trade and (3) to wear down the opponent by
projecting military power into the opponent's country and by
subsidizing allies who will attack the opponent. Mahan
believed that if a Sea Power is able to maintain its own
access to maritime trade while severing the opponent's
access, the Sea Power should be able to outlast its opponent.
(Ref. 4:pp. 371-372)
3. Strategic Value
Mahan believed that the issue of military advantage
or strategic value can always be resolved into two elements:
force and position. With regards to position, he believed
that the strategic value of any location depended upon three
conditions: (1) its geography or proximity to strategic
lines of communication, (2) its military strength, both offen-
sive and defensive, and (3) its resources. Of these three
conditions, the location's proximity to strategic lines of
communication is the most important—military strength and
resources can be artificially supplied, but geography can
never be changed. (Ref. 2: p. 372)
B. APPLICATION TO THE PANAMA CANAL
Applying Mahan' s concepts to the U.S. interest in the
Panama Canal results in the following analysis. Humankind
is evolving toward a higher and more beneficial social order.
However, the security of this evolution is not guaranteed:
individual nations or groups of nations, through violence,
can hinder this process or threaten the progress thusfar
obtained. The United States is part of this evolutionary
process. Because of its historic circumstances, the United
States is a great Sea Power. This Sea Power is a useful tool
in the evolutionary proces-s and permits the United States to
exercise a role of global leadership, if it so chooses.
The issue which remains is to determine the strategic
value of the Panama Canal to U.S. Sea Power. Given Panama's
lack of resources, military or otherwise, the value of the
canal hinges on its geography or proximity to strategic lines
of communication. Chapter Two of this study examines the
history of the Panamanian crossroad in order to illustrate the
principle that Panama's location gives it enduring strategic
value—especially to a great Sea Power like the United States.
Chapter Three reviews the economic, military and political
costs that have been incurred by the two great Sea Powers
which have controlled this strategic location. Chapter Four
looks to the future of the Panama Canal and concludes with a
discussion of U.S. strategy toward Panama.
II. HISTORIC VALUE
Since the 1500' s, the Panamanian Isthmus has had strategic
value to whichever Sea Power controlled it. However, of the
three components of Mahan's concept of strategic value, only
the area's geographical position has been the source of
indigenous strength. Foreign Sea Powers have had both to
develop Panama economically and to provide for its defense.
Thus, the ultimate worth of the Isthmus to a Sea Power depends
on whether the value stemming from its geographical position
outweighs the cost resulting from its maintenance and defense.
This chapter will review the historic value of the Isthmus to
two great Sea Powers—Spain and the United States. This value
has been both commercial and military in nature. From this
history, two principles may be discerned. First, the Isthmus
has considerable value when it holds a monopoly on an important
line of communication. Second, this value diminishes when
either the monopoly is broken or the value of the commerce
declines. Given the existing circumstances in relation to
U.S. interests, the canal has minor commercial value, but
major military importance.
A. COMMERCIAL VALUE
1. The Spanish Empire
From the early 1500' s to the mid-1700 1 s, Panama held
a legal monopoly over key trade within the Spanish Empire.
The Panamanian town of Nombre de Dios shared a monopoly with
Vera Cruz and Cartegena to* conduct trade between Spain and
Spain's possessions in the Western Hemisphere. By the mid-
1500 1 s, Panama was the third richest Spanish possession, and
Panama City was the most important city in all of the Americas.
At the height of Panama's sixteenth century prosperity, 14
to 15 Spanish ships visited Panama each year. The Spanish
fleet delivered supplies and slaves to Panama to be transhipped
to the rest of the Spanish Pacific. In return, Panama deliv-
ered to the fleet the treasure which it has accumulated from
throughout the Spanish Pacific. (Ref. 5:pp. 3»9; Ref. 6:pp.
248-250)
By the l600's, the value of the Isthmus began to
decline as the Spanish colonies' production of precious
metals dwindled. Furthermore, Panama gradually began to lose
its monopoly over colonial trade. In the l600's, the monopoly
was illegally compromised by the growth of smuggling. Then,
in the early 1700 's, the English gained limited trade priv-
ileges within the Spanish Empire; the English embraced the
trade, but ignored the limits. The English trade bypassed
Panama by shipping directly from English ports to Spanish
colonial ports. Accordingly, fewer and fewer colonial mer-
chants came to Panama to buy the more expensive Spanish goods.
In an attempt to curb the English smuggling, the Spanish in
17^0 relaxed colonial trade restrictions and permitted direct
trade between Spain and the colonial ports in the Spanish
Pacific. With this relaxation, Panama lost its legal monopoly
over Spanish colonial trade. Trade within the Empire improved,
but Panama lost its commercial importance. (Ref. 5:pp. 11-13;
Ref. 6:pp. 390, 473, 586-587)
2. The United States
The development of California in the late l840's
created a major "trade region in the Pacific and thus renewed
the demand for Isthmian transportation. The years 1850-1855
were a time of great prosperity for Panama, as goods and
travelers once more streamed across the Isthmus. Travelers
at that time described Panama City as a "wide-open booming
seaport" and reported that the city was a "better place of
business than San Francisco." The upsurge in opportunities
led U.S. private investors to finance the construction of
the Panama Railway to replace the Spanish mule trail which
crossed the Isthmus. After the railroad was completed in
1855s both local and global trade increased to an even
higher level. (Ref. 7:p. 112; Ref. 8:p. 672)
The U.S. intercoastal trade was important, but as
early as the late l850's this trade constituted only ten
percent of the Isthmian traffic; the majority of the trade
was either between North America and Asia or between North
America and Europe. The United States, in addition to
developing California, was industrializing and expanding its
economic role in the world. Between 1848 and 1869, approx-
imately 600,000 people crossed through Panama—400,000
transiting via the railroad between I856 and 1866. The flow
of goods was also impressive: precious metals, paper money,
jewelry, mail, coal, lumber, oil, wine and other merchandise.
(Ref. 5:p. 18; Ref. 7:p. 36; Ref. 8:p. 673)
Beginning in the late 1860's, the value of the Isthmus
began to diminish as alternate lines of communication were
established. In 1869, the U.S. completed the Union Pacific
Railroad which offered an efficient and direct connection
between the U.S. East Coast and the West Coast. Furthermore,
the Eritish established a line of large steamships running
from Europe, through the Straits of Magellan, to ports in
the South Pacific. While the railroad diverted American
trade away from Panama, the steamships diverted European
trade. (Ref. 8:p. 673)
Panama regained a monopoly of sorts with the U.S.
government's completion of the Panama Canal in 191^. The
canal permits a ship to transit between the mid-Atlantic and
the mid-Pacific Oceans without having to steam 8,000 miles
around South America—a considerable savings in shipping
costs. While other modes of transportation between the West
Coast and East Coast of the Americas exist—such as railroads,
highways and pipelines—the canal remains the only such
maritime line of communication.
Approximately one half to two thirds of all canal
traffic is either in transit to or in transit from the United
States. The canal accommodates all types of cargo, although
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bulk-type goods predominate. In 1986 the primary cargo
transiting the canal was either petroleum and petroleum
products (22. 15S of canal traffic) or grains (16.4%)
.
Furthermore, the primary trade transiting the canal was
either between Asia and the U.S. East Coast (36% of canal
traffic) or between Europe and the U.S. West Coast (12% )
.
However, despite the dominance of U.S. trade in the canal,
this canal traffic only accounts for approximately lk% of
U.S. oceanborne foreign trade. It is generally conceded
that Latin America is far more dependent on the canal for
its foreign trade than is the United States. (Ref. 9'9
Ref. 10; Ref. ll:pp. 3^1, 447)
In summary, the commercial value of the Panamanian
Isthmus has varied dramatically over the course of its
history. The commercial value of the Isthmus has depended
on the volume and value of the trade and on the availability
of alternate trade routes. The Isthmus has had its greatest
value when it is the only route for a high valued trade and
has had its lowest value when the economics of commercial
transportation dictate the bypassing of Panama. At present,
the Panama Canal is the only maritime line of communication
through the Americas, but the value of this trade to the
United States is only modest.
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B. MILITARY VALUE
In addition to its commercial value, the Isthmus has
always had a military value. For the Spanish Empire, it was
a line of communications for projecting Spanish power into
the Pacific. For the United States, it has been both a means
to project power into the Atlantic or the Pacific and a means
to enhance the maritime defense of the United States.
1. The Spanish Empire
During the 1500* s, Panama provided a short link
between the Caribbean and the Pacific and thus became a
major base of operations for Spanish expansion into the
Pacific. The historian H. E. Bancroft claimed that without
Panama, Spain would neither have been able to conquer Peru
nor have been able to keep it (Ref. 6:pp. 249-250). Panama
remained an important military line of communication until
the mid-1700' s when Spain opened alternate commercial lines
of communication between itself and the Americas. These
new lines of communication became the new military lines of
communication, and Panama became a military as well as
economic backwater (Ref. 5:pp. 12-13). By the l800*s, Spain
lost control of the majority of its empire in the Americas,
and Panama ceased to be of military importance.
2. The United States
Panama regained its military importance in the early
1900 's with the opening of the Panama Canal and the development
of U.S. naval power. Long before the canal was completed,
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the U.S. considered the strategic consequences of such a
canal. In 1879 U.S. Senator Ambrose Burnside of Rhode Island
(the Union commander at the Battle of Fredericksburg) pro-
posed a resolution to the effect that the U.S. "would not
view without serious disquietude any attempt of the powers
of Europe to establish under their protection and domination
a ship-canal across the isthmus of Darien." (Ref. 12:p. 7D
In 1881 the House Committee on Foreign Affairs issued a
report which concluded that such a canal would be "of vast
and paramount importance to the people of the United States."
(Ref. 12:p. 82)
In 1890 Mahan, in his The Influence of Sea Power Upon
History, 1660-1783 , elaborated on these ideas. Mahan saw
that the canal would attract international rivalries into
the Caribbean and that these rivalries would mix with unset-
tled political conditions there to produce a dangerous situa-
tion very close to the United States. If America mastered
these problems, it would be propelled to international
greatness. To master these problems, the U.S. would need
a modern navy, adequate coastal defenses, overseas naval
bases, plus a revived U.S. merchant marine. Mahan' s proposed
global strategy was "dominance in the Caribbean, equality in
the Pacific, and interested abstention from the strictly
Continental rivalries of the European powers." (Ref. 13 :p. 88)
Mahan warned that if the U.S. chose to ignore the problems
posed by the canal, then another power would usurp the U.S.
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role in the Caribbean. If this happened, the American people
would face a "rude awakening." (Ref. l:p. 33; Ref. 13:pp. 81-85)
The Spanish-American War provided a dramatic lesson
in the importance of an Isthmian canal. At the outbreak of
the war, the U.S. battleship OREGON was in San Francisco.
The navy ordered the OREGON to Florida to join the U.S. fleet
preparing to engage the Spanish fleet in Cuba. Because of
the absence of a canal, the OREGON had to travel around
Cape Horn—a voyage of 12,000 miles (instead of 4,000 miles
if there had been a canal). The battleship left San Francisco
on March 19, 1898 and arrived off Palm Beach, Florida on
May 24, i.e., 67 days later. (Ref. 7: p. 254)
After the completion of the canal in 1914, the U.S.
Army assumed responsibility for the canal's defense. In its
strategic planning for the defense of the United States, the
Army appreciated the importance of the canal. In May of
1939, the Army's War Plans Division described Panama as "the
Keystone in the defense of the Western Hemisphere." (Ref. 14:
p. 18) The Army recognized the Navy as the nation's first
line of defense against either European or Asian threats.
The canal provided a swift and secure means to concentrate
the fleet against a threat from either direction. When the
Navy, in July of 1940, shifted the bulk of the fleet to the
Pacific to counter the rising Japanese danger, the Army
concluded that the canal had then become "the most strategic
spot in the world today." (Ref. l4:p. 64) The Army was
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concerned about the ability of the fleet to move quickly
from the Pacific to the Atlantic, if necessary, to counter
the rising German threat.
The canal proved its strategic value to the United
States during the Second World War. Approximately, 6,400
combatants and 10,300 supply vessels (loaded with 24 million
tons of military' supplies) transited the canal during the
war (Ref. ll:p. l42j Ref. 15:p. 81) The direction of this
wartime commerce was primarily from the East Coast of the
United States to the war zones in the Pacific. These sta-
tistics include the return trips by the same ship. (Ref. 16:
p. 201; Ref. 17:p. 166)
After the Second World War, with the advent of nuclear
weapons, the strategic value of the canal became subject to
serious question. The existence of nuclear weapons seemed
to undermine, if not totally eliminate, the value of the
canal. Since the Navy could not prevent a nuclear attack
on the United States, it was no longer the nation's first
line of defense. Furthermore, while the Army and Navy were
confident that they could continue to protect the canal
from sabotage, naval bombardment and air attack, there was
no defense to a nuclear missile. (Ref. l8:pp. 55-56)
However, the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis
and the Vietnam War proved the enduring wartime value of the
canal—even in the nuclear age. During the Korean War, the
use of the canal by naval combatants and military supply
15
vessels tripled from its peacetime level of use. An estimated
22£ of the Army's supplies -in Korea passed through the canal.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, one half of the amphibious
forces which took station off Cuba came from the U.S. West
Coast—via the canal. Finally, during the Vietnam War, the
use of the canal by naval combatants and military supply
ships quintupled from peacetime levels. In 1968 approximately
59% of the U.S. supplies in Vietnam passed through the canal.
The Department of Defense estimated that between 1967 and 1970,
the canal saved the U.S. approximately $72 million per year
in transportation costs. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during a portion of the
war, stated that the canal was useful both as a means of
transferring combatants from the Atlantic to relieve the
burden on the Pacific units and as a means of swiftly rein-
forcing the Pacific Fleet if either the Soviet or Chinese
navies had become involved in the Vietnam War. (Ref . 11: p. 108;
Ref. 17:p. 166; Ref. 19:pp. 10-11; Ref. 20:pp. l44 3 301, 314;
Ref. 21:pp. 217, 270)
During the 1977-1978 national debate over the Panama
Canal Treaty, U.S. military leaders testified that the canal
was of continuing value to the United States. Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown stated that "the Panama Canal will, for
the foreseeable future, be an important defense artery for the
United States." (Ref. 21:p. 240) Chairman of the Joint
16
Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown, U.S.A.F., agreed,
observing that the canal is
...a major defense asset, the use of which enhances U.S.
capability for timely reinforcement of U.S. forces. The
strategic military value of the canal is reflected in our
ability to accelerate the shift of military forces and
logistics support by sea between the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans.
(Ref. 21 :p. 240) In a letter to President Jimmy Carter, four
former Chiefs of Naval Operations—Admirals Thomas H. Moorer,
Arleigh A. Burke, Robert B. Carney and George W. Anderson
—
stressed the "increasingly important" value of the canal
(Ref. 22:pp. 10-11).
In summary, the canal is a very valuable strategic
asset during wartime. By providing a secure and direct
maritime route through the Americas, it possesses a practical
monopoly over important military communications. These com-
munications are of two types. First, the canal provides
a means to shift the Navy quickly between the two oceans.
Second, the canal is a major defense artery for the supply
of our forces overseas. While the canal may be only of
minor commercial importance to the United States, in terms
of national security it is a unique and valuable asset.
17
III. HISTORIC COSTS
In order to benefit from Panama's strategic value, Spain
and the United States both incurred significant costs. These
costs were of an economic, military and political nature.
Economically, the various forms of Isthmian transportation
had to be built and maintained. Militarily, the crossroad
had to be fortified and defended. Politically, other powers
had to be kept at arms length, and Panamanian nationalism
had to be either accommodated or resisted. From this history,
three principles may be discerned. First, the development
and maintenance of Isthmian transportation has relied heavily
on foreign investment. Second, the defense of the Isthmus
poses an extremely complex military problem. Ideally, not
only must the Isthmus be fortified and guarded on a continuing
basis, but also the adjacent seas must be controlled and
hostile powers must be prevented from establishing military
bases within the region. Finally, while economic and military
considerations dictate an active foreign role within Panama,
this foreign presence stimulates a strong, nationalistic
reaction from the Panamanian people. This reaction poses
a significant political cost to any power which seeks to
employ the Isthmus as a commercial and military asset.
18
A. THE SPANISH EMPIRE
1. Economic Costs
In the 1520' s, Spain built a mule trail, the Camino
Real, across the Panamanian Isthmus. Given Panama's mountains,
jungles and periodic floods, the project was costly. In the
1530' s, a station, known as Cruces, was built at the head of
navigation on the Chagres River. During the dry season, the
entire highway was traversible by land. However, during the
rainy season, travel was by land between Panama City and
Cruces, and then by river between Cruces and the Caribbean.
The entire journey during the rainy season could take up to
two weeks. The Spanish deliberately kept the road primitive
in order to discourage attacks. This transit remained
basically unchanged from 1521 to 1855. (Ref. 6:p. 248; Ref. 23:
p. 248; Ref. 24:pp. 194, 301)
2. Military Costs
While Spain's investment in the development of the
Camino Real was minimal after the 1520' s, the Spanish investment
in the defense of the road was considerable until the mid-
1700' s. Beginning in the late 1500's, Spain faced naval
challenges in the Americas from the English, French and Dutch.
Panama, as a nerve center for colonial communications, became
a battleground for these rivalries.
More than any other nation, England posed the greatest
naval challenge to Spain's control of Panama. England launched
raids against the Isthmus in 1572, 1575, 1585-1586, 1595-1596,
19
1602, 1739 and 1740. In 1741 the English attempted to occupy
Panama. The campaign was a coordinated attack from both the
Caribbean and the Pacific. From the Caribbean, a fleet of 29
major warships, plus smaller craft, with 27,000 sailors and
soldiers planned to attack Cartegena and then occupy Panama.
Prom the Pacific, a fleet of six warships with 1500 men was
to raid the coast of Peru and then support the occupation of
Panama. The campaign failed when the Caribbean forces were
defeated at Cartegena. (Ref. 5:p. 10; Ref. 6:pp. 405-415,
418-420, 465, 589-593)
The problem of defending Panama became increasingly
difficult beginning in the mid-1600' s. In the 1630' s and
l640's, English, French and Dutch settlers poured into the
Caribbean and occupied islands which the Spanish had left
unguarded. These settlements not only increased the rivalry
in the Caribbean, they also provided secure bases for smug-
gling and raids on the Spanish. In the late l600's$ the
Spanish suffered heavily at the hands of the buccaneers.
"Buccaneers" were pirates who were aligned with a European
power, were supported by that power and conducted attacks
on the Spanish from Caribbean bases. Buccaneers attacked
Panama throughout the l660's to the l680's, including the
capture and destruction of Panama City in 1671. The problem
with the buccaneers remained until the European powers began
to withdraw their support. (Ref. 5:pp. 11-12; Ref. 6:pp. 486-
508, 517-540)
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After the failed English campaign in the 17^0 *s,
Spain continued to fortify- and defend Panama. However,
these defenses were never tested again. With the rerouting
of Spain's commercial lines of communication around the
tip of South America, Panama lost its strategic importance.
Then, in the early l800 ! s, the Spanish hold on both Panama
and the majority of Latin America was broken. With the
loss of these interests, Spain withdrew its protection.
3. Political Costs
Until the 17^0' s, Panama held a privileged place
within the Spanish Empire and economically depended on its
trade monopoly granted by Spain. Until the Spanish Empire
began to crumble, the Panamanians never challenged Spanish
rule. As late as the mid-1800' s, the average Panamanian
showed very little inclination to become involved in politics
Accordingly, coping with Panamanian nationalism was never
a political cost to the Spanish control of the Isthmus.
(Ref. 8:p. 524)
B. THE UNITED STATES
1. Economic Costs
In the late 1840's, American investors perceived the
renewed demand for Isthmian transportation and financed the
construction of the Panama Railway. The investors expected
the construction to require two years and a cost of two
million dollars, but the project actually required five years
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and a cost of eight million dollars. Furthermore, during the
course of the railroad's construction, between I85O and 1855,
approximately 6,000 laborers died, mostly from disease. None-
theless, the railroad proved to be a financial success and
a great boon to the Isthmian economy. A system of foreign
steamship service quickly developed to shuttle passengers
and goods between the railroad's terminus ports and other
ports throughout the world. (Ref. 7:p. 35; Ref. 8:p. 664)
In the 1870' s, a private French company attempted
to improve Isthmian transportation by digging a sea-level
canal across Panama. The company estimated that the project
would cost $132 million, raised $275 million from public
subscriptions in France and bought vast quantities of the
best equipment then available: 32 steam shovels; 3*300
flatcars and trucks; 49 locomotives; 169 drills; 14 dredges;
92 boats, barges, tugs, lighters and other small craft; 80
miles of railway track; and 96 pumps. Thousands of laborers
were brought from the West Indies, and hundreds of skilled
workers were brought from France. In June of 1881, the French
bought the Panama Railway for $17 million, and in January of
1882 they began the digging. (Ref. 7:pp. 118, 135-136; Ref. 17:
PP. 36-37)
The French grossly underestimated the difficulty of
the project. An estimated 20,000 to 22,000 workers died,
mostly from disease. The digging was hindered by torrential
floods, mud slides and almost impenetrable rock. In February
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of 1889 the company went into receivership, and by May of
I889 all work on the canal- ceased. The French spent approx-
imately $300 million, but only completed about one third
of the necessary excavation. (Ref. 7:pp. 195-203, 235, 610;
Ref. 17:p. 37; Ref. 25:p. 146; Ref. 26:p. 25)
In 1904 the U.S. government acquired the remnants of
the French work and recommenced the digging. The U.S.
adopted a lock-and-lake design for the canal and completed
the task in August of 1914. Adding both the French and
American costs, the Panama Canal cost approximately $639
million and 25,000 lives. The French and the Americans
excavated over 232 million cubic yards of mud and rock,
an amount three times as great as that excavated during
the French construction of the Suez Canal. (Ref. 5:p. 26;
Ref. 7:pp. 402, 488, 610-611)
Vessels transiting the canal from the Caribbean to
the Pacific enter the canal at Cristobal, Panama. From
there, the vessels travel approximately five miles until
they reach a series of three locks known as the "Gatun Locks."
The locks raise the ships from sea-level to eighty-five feet
above sea-level. The ships are thus able to make the thirty-
one mile transit from the Gatun Locks, through Gatun Lake,
to the ten-mile long Culebra Cut. The vessels then return to
sea-level, via the Pedro Miguel Lock and the Miraflores Locks,
and exit into the Pacific at Balboa, Panama. The locks are
double-lock in construction, so as to permit simultaneous
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vessel transit In both directions. The transit from the
Pacific to the Caribbean is exactly the same, except in
reverse order from the Caribbean to Pacific transit.
(Ref. 15: Figures 2 & 3)
The design of the canal today is the same as it
was in 1914, although the U.S. has continued to make
improvements. The Culebra Cut has been widened to 500
feet, a second storage dam has been built across the
Chagres River, the original towing locomotives have been
replaced, and channel lighting has been installed (to
permit nighttime and poor visibility transits). In
addition, dredging remains a continuous duty. (Ref. 7:
pp. 612-613)
2. Military Costs
With the completion of the canal, the U.S. Army
assumed reponsibility for the canal's defense. Until the
1930's, the Army considered the principal threat to- the
canal to be either sabotage or naval bombardment of the
canal's locks and dams. The Army's solution was to position
powerful coastal guns at either terminus, plus establish
field fortifications for the locks and dams. Beginning in
the 1930' s, the Army also became concerned about the threat
posed by combat aircraft—either from land bases or from
carriers. The Army's solution was to establish an air
defense network around the canal, based on long-range air
patrols, local radar installations and a screen of outlying
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bases. Local sites for air bases, air defense guns and
radar installations were o-btained from Panama. Outlying
bases were obtained in Puerto Rico, Cuba, Jamaica, Antigua,
St. Lucia, Trinidad, British Guiana, Peru, Ecuador, the
Galapagos Islands and Guatemala. (Ref. 27:pp. 301, 303*
327 and 339-3^0)
The Second World War never tested the U.S. prepar-
ations against sabotage, naval bombardment, air attack
or invasion. Nonetheless, the defenses were tested and
found wanting. The gap in the canal's defenses proved
to be in the defense of merchant shipping using the canal.
At the ABC Conference with Eritain and Canada in March of
19^1* the United States agreed to protect allied shipping •
as its principal naval task in the event that the U.S.
became a belligerent. But when the war came, the U.S.
proved unprepared for this task. (Ref. 28 :p. 49)
The German U-boats began a campaign against allied
shipping in the Western Hemisphere in February of 19^2.
The results shocked the U.S. war planners. With regards to
the Western Caribbean, between February and July of 19^2,
the Germans sank 114 ships for a total loss of over 500,000
tons of allied and neutral shipping. The Caribbean was
entirely the responsibility of the United States, but the
Navy lacked both equipment and training. The Navy did not
institute convoys until that July, and even when they did
the initial results were embarrassing. Between July and
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September of 1942, the U-boats sank seventy-five ships in
the Caribbean, the majority of them under U.S. escort. From
July to December total allied and neutral losses in the area
were 157 ships or over 770,000 tons of shipping. (Ref. 28:
pp. 49, 144-148, 347; Ref. 27:p. 431)
One of the problems in the Western Caribbean was the
division of responsibility between the Army and the Navy.
On December 12, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt decided
that the Army would be responsible for the Panama Coastal
Frontier (which included both Panama and the adjacent
Pacific waters), while the Navy would be responsible for
the Caribbean Coastal Frontier. Accordingly, the Army
concentrated its resources against the threats of sabotage
and Japanese air, surface or submarine attack. The Japanese
attacks never materialized. Meanwhile, on the Caribbean side,
by December of 1943 the Germans had destroyed almost two
million tons of allied or neutral shipping. (Ref. 27 :p. 410;
Ref. 28:p. 200)
Starting in 1943 the U.S. defenses in the Caribbean
became increasingly effective as the U.S. increased both the
quantity and the quality of its convoy escorts, patrol aircraft
and radar stations. Between January and July of 1943* the
Germans sank only 22 ships (over 107,000 tons). In July and
August, the Germans launched an intensive campaign against
Caribbean shipping, employing ten U-boats. This campaign
resulted in the loss of only six allied or neutral ships
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(approximately 35*000 tons) at a cost of seven U-boats. Ey
that December, the German abandoned the Caribbean as a
theater of operations. (Ref. 27:p. 431; Ref. 28:p. 200)
After the Second World War, the U.S. military began
to consider the problem of defending the Panama Canal from
a nuclear attack. In August of 1953 the U.S. exploded a
simulated forty kiloton atomic bomb near the Miraflores Locks
in order to train defense crews. By 1957 the U.S. concluded
that the canal was defenseless against nuclear attacks. The
U.S. requested additional bases from Panama in order to
construct missile sites to protect the canal. The Panamanians
took the request "under advisement," the U.S. did not press
its request and no further attempts were made to defend the
canal from a nuclear attack. (Ref. l8:pp. 49-50, 55-56)
The issue of the defense of the canal was addressed
at length during the Congressional hearings on the 1977
Panama Canal Treaties. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Robert L. J. Long, told the Seante Foreign Relations
Committee that defending the canal from a nuclear attack was
"virtually impossible." Ke observed that this vulnerability
was shared by most other U.S. installations. Furthermore,
in the event of a nuclear war between the super powers, the
canal would probably be of inconsequential value. (Ref. 11:
p. 101)
The Department of Defense and the State Department
identified four possible threat scenarios: (1) terrorist
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attacks against the canal's locks, dams and other key points;
(2) a commando operation, -several thousand strong, which was
neither supported nor opposed by the Panamanian military;
(3) a commando operation supported by the Panamanians and
(4) a large-scale military campaign, conducted by the Cubans
and the Panamanians with the support of other guerrilla
forces. The report concluded that continuous operation of
the canal could not be guaranteed, but that only limited
interruption could be. The U.S. forces in Panama could counter
the first threat by itself and could counter the second,
third and fourth threats if able to be reinforced from the
United States. In the event of the fourth scenario, the
report estimated that the needed U.S. commitment would be
about three divisions or 100,000 troops (Ref. ll:pp. 132,
180-182)
Robert G. Cox, a civilian witness, told the House
Subcommittee on the Panama Canal that there were '"thirteen
possible actions which could lead to the closure of the
canal: (1) sabotage of power supplies or lock machinery;
(2) small arms or artillery fire against ships in transit
or the locks, (3) mining of the waterways, (4) drainage of
Gatun Lake through a breach in the locks or dams, (5) seizure
of hostages in order to interrupt operations, (6) kamikaze
attacks by low performance aircraft, (7) armed rebellion by
the Panamanians, (8) civil disobedience and labor strikes,
(9) scuttling of a ship in the locks or channel, (10) commando
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assault, (11) nuclear missile attack, (12) combat aircraft
or (13) naval blockade. He believed that the first four or
five threats were the most likely, but acknowledged that the
probabilities depended on the existing international situa-
tion. He concluded that the canal was "one of the least
defensible waterways in the world." (Ref. 20: p. 149)
The military experts who testified before Congress
disagreed with Cox. Lieutenant General D. P. McAuliffe,
commander of U.S. forces in Panama, testified to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the existing U.S.
defenses were adequate. While he could not guarantee the
uninterrupted operation of the canal, he was convinced that
he could limit any such interruption to a short duration.
(Ref. 11: pp. 102-103)
An important issue was whether the U.S. could
properly defend the canal without U.S. forces in Panama.
Colonel John P. Sheffy, the Executive Director of the 1970
Canal Study Commission, told the House Subcommittee on the
Panama Canal that "in the absence of adequate defense
rights and effective U.S. defense forces on site, the Panama
Canal will be denied to the U.S. in an emergency." Sheffy
explained that, short of a nuclear attack, the only attack
which could seriously harm the canal would one that successfully
destroyed the dams or locks and then let Gatun Lake drain.
Studies and exercises have demonstrated that while on-site
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forces can not totally prevent the attacks on the locks, they
can stop the draining of the lake. If the necessary U.S.
forces are not present, then a very limited attack can
paralyze the canal for two years. (Ref. 20:pp. 146, 15*0
3. Political Costs
For the United States, there have been three inter-
related political arenas which involve the canal: the U.S.
domestic arena, the global arena and the Panamanian arena.
U.S. domestic politics is outside the scope of this study.
This section will first look at the costs of the canal in
terms of global politics and then will focus on the costs
in terms of U.S. -Panamanian relations.
a. Global Politics
The first diplomatic policy adopted by the U.S.
to defend the canal was to try to dominate the Caribbean,
to the exclusion of all other powers. To avoid even the
pretext for another power's intervention, the U.S. unila-
terally assumed the responsibility for the area and exercised
a "benevolent, imperial tutelage." (Ref. 13:pp. 142-143)
However, by the 1920' s, the U.S. doubted the wisdom of this
policy. The more the U.S. tried to intervene to bring
stability to the Caribbean, the weaker and the less stable
the region seemed to be. Furthermore, anti-U.S. feelings
spread throughout all of Latin America. The U.S. searched
for a better solution.
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The better solution proved to be Franklin
Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor- Policy. " Roosevelt declared
that it was not in the U.S. interest to acquire any territory
belonging to any Latin American republic. This declaration,
plus an increased sensitivity toward Latin American senti-
ments, defused much of the anti-U.S. tension throughout the
hemisphere. As the Second World War drew closer, Roosevelt
attempted to develop this new good will into a hemispheric
solidarity against the Axis powers. This aspect of the
Good Neighbor Policy met with varying degrees of success.
(Ref. 27:p. 305; Ref. 29:p. 172)
Overall, Roosevelt's diplomacy toward Latin
America was a success and a cornerstone of U.S. national
security during the Second World War. Between December 7 >
19^1 and January 15, 19*12, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama
and El Salvador joined the war against the Axis. During
this same period, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela severed
diplomatic relations with the Axis nations. Before the
war ended, only Argentina and Chile refused to sever
diplomatic relations with the Axis; the remaining nineteen
Latin American countries supported the U.S. war effort.
(Ref. 29:pp. 172-174, 211)
In the 1950' s, U.S. and Soviet diplomatic
competition brought the Cold War to Latin America. Both
the U.S. and the Soviet perceived that the history of U.S.
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Imperialism in the Caribbean offered an opportunity for
Soviet and Communist penetration. The U.S. sensed the need
to continue to seek the good will of the Latin Americans.
However, with the brief exception of President Kennedy's
development initiatives in the early 1960's, the U.S. priorities
lay elsewhere and Latin America did not receive the U.S.
attention which it had in the 1930' s. Furthermore, the U.S.
remained willing to Intervene where It perceived a danger
to its interests—for example, Guatemala in the 1950' s, the
Dominican Republic in the 1960's and Chile in the 1970' s.
Throughout this era, the U.S. control of the
Panama Canal Zone remained a sensitive subject. The U.S.
claimed its rights under the 1903 Hay-Buna-Varilla Treaty
with Panama. Nonetheless, from many quarters, the U.S.
heard the observation that the Canal Zone constituted a
U.S. colony within Latin America. President Carter, when
he assumed office in 1977, vowed to divest the U.S. of its
ownership of the Canal Zone and thus improve the U.S. diplo-
matic standing with both Panama and the rest of Latin
America.
During the Congressional hearings on the 1977
Panama Canal Treaties, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance told
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the treaty
would "promote constructive and positive relationships
between the United States and the other nations in this
hemisphere." (Ref. 11: p. 10) Ellsworth Bunker, one of the
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conegotiators of the treaty, stated that he had long
perceived "how urgent was the need for the United States
to modernize its relationship with Panama, and how important
such a step forward was for our position in the hemisphere."
(Ref. ll:p. 15) Sol Linowitz, the other conegotiator,
testified that "all the countries of the hemisphere have
made common cause in looking upon our position in the canal
as the last vestige of a colonial past which evokes bitter
memories and deep animosities." (Ref. ll:pp. 19-20)
Despite strong opposition by U.S. conservatives within
both the Senate and the rest of the country, the 1977 Panama
Canal Treaty and the accompanying 1977 Neutrality Treaty
were ratified by the Senate in 1978.
The U.S. and the Soviets continue to compete
diplomatically throughout Latin America, and the U.S.
presence in Panama somewhat remains a point of contention.
The Soviets recognize that the Panama Canal is a "strategically
important waterway." (Ref. 30) Since 1977 Soviet diplomacy
has been very active toward Panama. The Soviets have sought
to expand their influence by championing Panamanian nationalism
(Ref. 31 )f hy developing the Panamanian communist party
(Ref. 32) and by working to establish diplomatic relations
with Panama (Ref. 33). Simultaneously, the Soviets have
sought to reduce U.S. influence by isolating the U.S. diplo-
matically (Ref. 3*0 and by pressuring for the reduction of
the U.S. military presence in the region (Ref. 35). Judging
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by the results, the Soviets have been successful. The Soviets
may be close to opening official ties with Panama and have
helped to keep the U.S. presence, both in the Canal Zone and
in the region, a source of contention. On the other hand,
the U.S. remains the significant diplomatic, military and
economic influence in the region. Likewise, the Panamanian
communists remain only a minor political force within
Panama.
The Soviets relate their campaign for support
in Panama to their campaign for support throughout Latin
America. This diplomatic policy takes two forms. First,
the Soviets link what is happening to Panama to what is
happening in Latin America. They portray purported U.S.
agression toward Panama and Central America as merely one
aspect of what the Soviets term the U.S. "Big Stick" policy
toward all of Latin America. The Soviets accuse the U.S.
of using "the canal area as a springboard to launch imperialist
aggressions" against the rest of Latin America (Ref. 36).
Second, the Soviets link what is happening in the rest of
Latin America to what is happening in Panama. The Soviets
claim that what is happening in Panama can best be understood
as part of a revolutionary movement throughout all of Latin
America (Ref. 37). While seeking to isolate the U.S. from
the Panama Canal, the Soviets also seek to isolate the U.S.
from Panama, Central America and the rest of Latin America.
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The U.S. diplomatic struggle for the Panama
Canal began in the early part of this century and continues
now unabated. While what the U.S. has struggled for and
who the U.S. has struggled with have changed over time,
the nature of global politics seems to dictate that there
will always be a struggle if the U.S. wishes to benefit
from the canal. This struggle also has a binational
context as well as an international context. It is to this
binational context, i.e., U.S. -Panamanian relations, to
which this study now turns.
b. U.S. -Panamanian Relations
In 1903, with U.S. support, Panama established
its independence from Colombia. The beginning was somewhat
shakey due to the questionable circumstances surrounding the
negotiation of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 which
gave the U.S. sovereign power over the Canal Zone "in
perpetuity." (Ref. 26:pp. 375-378, 384) However, all in
all, the initial relationship was very good. In the early
1900' s, many Panamanians favored the ultimate annexation of
Panama to the United States. As late as December of 1907,
Ricardo Arias, the Panamanian Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
argued for a relationship between the United States and
Panama comparable to that then existing between Great Britain
and its colony India. (Ref. 38:pp. 50, 133)
Nonetheless, the present conflict between Panamanian
nationalism and U.S. interests in the Panama Canal date back
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to 1908. With the U.S. heavily committed to the construction
of the canal, the U.S. became increasingly concerned about
the course of Panamanian politics. In 1908 U.S. Secretary
of War William Howard Taft told the U.S. Governor of the
Canal Zone, Joseph Blackburn, to tell Panamanian President
Dr. Manuel Amador to favor Jose Domingo de Obaldia over
Ricardo Arias in the 1908 Panamanian presidential elections.
Amador ignored the promptings and supported Arias. (Ref.
38:pp. 135-139)
Taft remained concerned about the 1908 elections
and pushed the U.S. deeper into Panamanian politics. Arias'
opposition party, partially to discredit the government,
called upon the U.S. to send troops to protect voters and
to prevent fraud. The U.S. declined the request. Obaldia'
s
party won the June 1908 municipal elections. While the U.S.
had not been directly involved in the elections, there was a
general feeling in Panama that Obaldia' s victory was largely
attributable to U.S. support. (Ref. 38:pp. 154-174)
Wishing to avoid a likely defeat in the July
presidential elections, Arias withdrew from the race. Despite
his own party's request for U.S. troops at the elections,
Arias tried to save face by blaming the U.S. for his party's
poor showing at the polls. He warned of the "imminent peril
of military occupation of the country by United States forces,
which would be a death blow to our national existence."
(Ref. 38: p. 178) Obaldia, the victor, also heightened the
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public impression of U.S. control and manipulation. In his
victory statement to the Panamanian people, Obaldia expressed
confidence "in the beneficial influence which the great and
powerful North American nation will exert over our incipient
nation...." (Ref. 38:p. 184) The retiring president, Dr.
Amador, remarked that both Obaldia and Arias, by their
conduct in the elections, had "seriously threatened the
existence of the Republic." (Ref. 38 :p. 184)
One pattern in U . S . -Panamanian relations was
now set. Fearing for the security of the canal, the U.S.
was prepared to act to protect it—even if this action
involved intervention in Panamanian politics. Likewise,
disgruntled factions within Panama were willing to call
for U.S. intervention to help them in their domestic struggles
Between 1906 and 1920, the U.S. military intervened four
times to restore civil order in Panama—three of these times
at the request of the Panamanian government. (Ref. 5:p. 27)
Another pattern in U . S . -Panamanian relations
was set in the 1930* s. The Panamanians came to view the
U.S. rights in the Canal Zone as an infringement upon
Panamanian sovereignty. In the 1930' s, the U.S. sought to
accommodate Panamanian demands while maintaining the U.S.
control of the canal. In 1933 the Panamanian President,
Harmodio Arias, traveled to Washington, D.C. to seek canal
concessions from Franklin Roosevelt. As Roosevelt had
decided to seek better U.S. -Latin American relations, he
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was receptive to Arias' requests. Before Arias departed,
Roosevelt agreed to limit U.S. rights in the Canal Zone to
those necessary for the "maintenance, operation, sanitation
and protection of the Canal." (Ref. 5:p. 30)
The Arias initiative ultimately led to the
Hull-Alfaro Treaty of 1936. The treaty abrogated the pro-
vision of the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty which provided
for a U.S. guarantee of Panama's independence and the
concomitant U.S. right to intervene. The U.S. also relin-
quished the right to expropriate additional Panamanian
land in connection with the defense of the canal.- Panama's
annuity was increased, and U.S. private commercial operations
within the Canal Zone which were unconnected to the canal's
operation were forbidden. This treaty was not ratified until
July of 1939j because the U.S. Senate was concerned with
what appeared to be a weakening of the canal's security.
Accordingly, ratification was delayed until Panama agreed
to accept the right of the U.S. both to defend the canal
unilaterally and to conduct military exercises within
Panama. (Ref. 5: p. 31)
Despite the accommodation achieved in 1939, the
U.S. grew increasingly concerned about the security of the
canal and the course of Panamanian politics. In 19^0 Arnulfo
Arias, Harmodio's brother, was elected Panama's president.
Arias appealed to Panamanian nationalism, opposed the U.S.
presence within Panama and sought to rid the country of all
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non-Hispanics. With fascist sympathies, Arias began to
obstruct U.S. preparations for the defense of the canal
and instead sought to establish Panama's neutrality during
the Second World War. With alleged U.S. support, the
Panamanian National Police deposed Arias in October of 19*11*
and thereafter the Panamanian government cooperated closely
with the U.S. throughout the war. (Ref. 5:p. 32; Ref. 18:
PP. 39-41)
The 19^1 coup marked the entry of the Panamanian
military, then known as the "National Police," into Pan-
amanian politics. Throughout the Second World War, the
military proved very effective in curbing Axis activity
within Panama—thus making the U.S. defense of the canal
an easier task. In February of 19^7* Jose Antonio Remon
became the commander of the police. That same year anti-
U.S. riots erupted throughout Panama over the issue of
the continuance of U.S. wartime bases. Remon effectively
subdued the riots and established the military as the
guarantor of the political order. Remon then reformed the
police into a "National Guard" and became the acknowledged
"king-maker" in Panamanian politics between 1948 and 1952.
(Ref. 5:p. 33; Ref. 39:p. 275)
Remon sought to be more than a military dictator.
He was elected to be Panama's president in 1952 and promptly
instituted a popular program of social and economic reform.
Remon realized that opposition to the U.S. presence in the
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Canal Zone was a fundamental Ingredient In Panamanian
nationalism. Accordingly, Remon traveled to Washington,
D.C. in 1953 to seek further canal concessions from the
U.S.—a populist ploy which had worked successfully for
Harmodio Arias in the 1930' s. Remon 1 s initiative led to
a new treaty in 1955 which further reduced U.S. commercial
activity within the Canal Zone and agreed to eliminate
U.S. wage discrimination against Panamanian canal workers.
Remon did not live to see the ratification of the treaty;
he was assassinated in January of 1955. (Ref. 5:p. 34;
Ref. I8:pp. 49-52; Ref. 39:pp. 275-276)
The U.S. concessions failed to check rising
Panamanian nationalism and anti-U.S. feelings. In 1956
agitation arose within Panama for the nationalization of
the canal. Anti-U.S. riots erupted in May of 1958, November
of 1959 and January of 1964. The 1964 riots were exceptionally
brutal, leaving 29 people dead and another 350 to 459 wounded.
U.S. President Lyndon Johnson promised to negotiate a new
treaty with Panama, and matters in 1964 settled into an
uneasy calm. However, as the new treaty negotiations
became inconclusive, anti-U.S. sentiment rose even higher
within Panama. In 1968 Arnulfo Arias again won the presiden-
tial election, campaigning on a platform calling for the
immediate return of the Canal Zone to Panama. (Ref. 5:
pp. 35-38; Ref. l8:pp. 52-53, 58, 117, 146-150; Ref. 40:
pp. 65-66)
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Arias held office only 11 days; on October 11,
1968 he was once more deposed by the Panamanian military.
This time the military kept the power for itself. The
National Guard's opponents were arrested, exiled or threatened
with expropriations. The Panamanian National Assembly and
all political parties were disbanded. The University of
Panama—the hotbed of popular agitation since its founding
in the 1930' s—was closed for several months while activist
faculty and students were systematically expelled. The
Panamanian media was brought under control by a combination
of censorship, intervention in management and expropriation.
The changes within the country were followed by a struggle
within the military to determine who would control both.
By December of 1969, General Omar Torrijos was the
unquestioned Commander of the National Guard and the Leader
of the Revolution. (Ref. 5:pp. 4, 42-43)
Like Remon, Torrijos aspired to be more than
a military dictator. To gain popular support, Torrijos
instituted a program of costly public works, urban renewal
and agrarian reform. Understanding the heart of Panamanian
nationalism, Torrijos pledged to seek the return of the
Canal Zone to Panama. Through such a program, Torrijos
succeeded in building a large following among nationalists,
urban workers and small farmers.
The treaty negotiations between the U.S. and
Panama failed to make significant progress until U.S. President
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Carter assumed office in 1977. With Carter's commitment to
improve U.S. relations with both Panama and the rest of
Latin America, the negotiations began in earnest. The
Panamanians sought immediate control of the canal, the
immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces and the payment
by the U.S. to Panama of a large cash grant. The U.S.
sought to lessen tensions between Panama and itself, while
maintaining its access to the canal. The final bargain
was made in the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty and in the 1977
Neutrality Treaty. In order to permit an orderly transition,
the Panama Canal Treaty provided that the U.S. would not
relinquish control of the canal until December 31, 1999.
To appease the Panamanian's desire for immediate control,
the Panamanians were given four seats on the nine man
Panama Canal Commission (the canal's Board of Directors),
were promised increasing participation in the operation of
the canal and were also given increased income from the
canal. By the year 2000, Panama will control the canal and
all U.S. forces will be withdrawn. (Ref. 40)
To protect the U.S. concerns with regards to
the defense of the canal, the U.S. insisted that the 1977
Neutrality Treaty be a part of the bargain. The Neutrality
Treaty guarantees the U.S. unrestricted access to the canal,
ensures that no third-party forces will be stationed in
Panama and makes the U.S. a guarantor of the canal's neutrality.
The Panamanians balked at the treaty, claiming that it would
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be a tool for continued U.S. Intervention in Panama. However,
Torrijos made the decision- to accept the two-treaty bargain
as the best way for Panama to gain control of the canal
without a violent confrontation with the U.S. (Ref. 40;
Ref. 4l)
The ratification of the two treaties in 1978
brought problems for both Panama and the United States. For
Panama, the treaties gave both too little and too much. The
treaty gave too little because Panama had to wait until 1999
to gain control of the canal and because the Neutrality
Treaty ostensibly gave the U.S. the right to intervene in
Panama after the year 1999 if the U.S. believes that the
canal's security is threatened. The treaty gave too much -
because by providing for the elimination of the U.S.
presence within Panama, it knocked the heart out of Panamanian
nationalism. In 1978 Torrijos commented that the ratification
of the treaties had left a "political emptiness" in Panama.
(Ref. 40; Ref. 4l:pp. 151-152)
From the U.S. perspective, the problem with the
treaties is that while the promised withdrawal of U.S. forces
and U.S. control lessened the sensitivity of Panama toward
the U.S., it increased the sensitivity of the U.S. toward
Panama. The economic and military health of the canal
depends on a long-term commitment by a stable and competent
government. The U.S. has provided such a commitment since
1904 and will continue to do so until 2000. After 2000 this
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responsibility will devolve onto the Panamanian government.
Accordingly, U.S. interests in the canal after 2000 will
depend on the Panamanian government. Realizing this, the
Carter Administration encouraged Torrijos to step down from
power and to begin to return Panama to democracy.
In October of 1978, Torrijos resigned as the
formal head of government, and political parties were
legalized. The Torrijos coalition became the ruling
Democratic Revolutionary Party, and the party selected
Aristides Royo to be the Panamanian President until elections
could be held in May of 1984. Torrijos remained the head
of the Panamanian Defense Forces and continued to influence
the policies of the government. (Ref. 5:p» 135)
On July 31, 1981, Torrijos died in a plane
crash. General Florencia Flores assumed command of the
military and an uneasy calm took hold until 19,82. In March
of 1982, Flores was forced into retirement, and General
Ruben Dario Paredes assumed control of the Defense Forces.
In July of 1982, Paredes forced President Royo to resign
and replaced him with Vice-President Ricardo de la Espriella.
(Ref. 42; Ref. 43)
In August of 1983* General Paredes voluntarily
retired from the Defense Forces in order to run for president
in 1984. General Manuel Antonio Noriega assumed command of
the military. Shortly after the change, Noriega made it clear
that Paredes would not receive the backing of the ruling
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party. Instead, In February of 1984, the Democratic Revolutionary
Party (DRP) chose Nicolas Ardito-Barletta to be its candidate
in the May elections. Ardito-Barletta was a minister of
planning under Torrijos and a Vice-President of the World
Bank. He lacked a personal power base within the country and
relied entirely on the DRP. (Ref. 44; Ref. 45:pp. 196-197)
Ardito-Barletta won the election, narrowly defeating
Arnulfo Arias who had returned from exile to run once more
for president. However, Ardito-Barletta' s -.election would
not conclude the era of Panama's political instability. With
the government besieged with economic problems and with loss
of political confidence, Noriega forced Ardito-Barletta to
resign in September of 1985. Vice-President Eric Arturo
Delvalle became the new Panamanian President, while Noriega
continued to exercise the real political power. (Ref. 45:
pp. 196-198)
This new political arrangement endured until
March of 1988. By this time, Noriega was opposed by the
majority of Panamanians and was indicted by a U.S. grand
jury in Miami on charges of aiding international cocaine
trafficking. In March, President Delvalle fired Noriega as
Commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces. However, Noriega
controlled the Panamanian National Assembly, so the Assembly
fired Delvalle as the President of Panama. Delvalle refused
to accept the decision, went into hiding and began to work
with the opposition parties to oust Noriega. (Ref. 46; Ref. 47)
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Once more the U.S. became concerned about the
course of Panamanian politics. While the opposition parties
within Panama conducted a general strike, the U.S.—at
Delvalle's request—froze Panamanian assets within the U.S.
and applied economic sanctions against the Noriega dominated
government. While the U.S. action has not yet produced a
serious anti-U.S. backlash within Panama, Noriega remains
in power. Thus, for the United States, while Panamanian
nationalism remains dormant from the ratification of the
Panama Canal Treaty, U.S. interests in the canal after the
year 2000 remain dependent on the future stability of the
Panamanian government. Since 1981, Panama has been unable
to produce such a government. (Ref. 48)
C . SUMMARY
In order to maintain the Isthmus as a link in their lines
of communication, Sea Powers have incurred substantial economic,
military and political costs. Economically, Spanish and
American investment developed the Isthmus. Militarily, both
Spain and the United States had to fortify and garrison the
Isthmus. Furthermore, the defense of the Isthmus has also
required extensive and complex military operations throughout
the hemisphere. Politically, the U.S. has had to pursue the
contradictory policy of ensuring the safety and operation of
the canal, while avoiding the backlash of Panamanian hostility
toward the U.S. presence. While pursuing this contradictory
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policy toward Panama, the U.S. has also tried to keep rival
powers out of the Caribbean and to minimize anti-U.S. feeling
throughout Latin America.
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IV. THE FUTURE
The future of the canal-both its value and its costs
—
depends on many factors. These factors could evolve in ways
to alter both the canal's value to the United States and its
costs. History indicates that anything which will affect
the value of the commerce transiting the canal will affact
the value of the canal itself. In terms of future costs,
most of these will depend upon the degree of cooperation or
of conflict between the United States and Panama. If after
2000 the United States and Panama are able to establish a
strong partnership, then the costs for the United States
will likely decrease. If conflict is the norm after 2000,
then costs will increase.
A. FUTURE VALUE
For the foreseeable future, the commercial and military
value of the canal to the United States is likely to remain
constant. Commercially, it should continue to be of
significant, although minor, value. Militarily, the canal
will continue to be an irreplaceable asset during wartime.
The most likely way to increase the value of the canal would
be to increase its capacity, but at the present this option
does not appear to be economically feasible. On the other
1+8
hand, its value could be decreased either by the development
of economic alternatives or by the deterioration of the
canal's service.
1. Increasing the Capacity
Due to the dimensions of the locks, the maximum
ship size which can presently transit the canal is 975 feet
in length, by 106 feet in width, by kO feet in draft (Ref
.
21 :p. 227). In the late 1970' s, these limitations meant
that of the approximately 22,500 merchant ships then in
use throughout the world, 1,300 ships (six percent) were
too large to transit the canal, while another 1,700 ships
(eight percent) could only transit with a partial load
(Ref. 15:p. 83). The alternatives to the present canal
are to build a new sea-level canal (i.e., a canal which
would not need locks) or to build a third and larger lane
of locks next to the exisiting two lanes. A sea-level
canal could accommodate vessels up to 300,000 tons, while
a third lane of locks could accommodate vessels over 100,000
tons. By way of comparison, the present canal can not
handle ships over approximately 70,000 tons.
Such solutions to the limited capacity of the canal,
while probably technically feasible, are not presently
economically feasible. For example, the estimated cost of
a sea-level canal in 1977 was six billion dollars while the
cost of a third set of locks was 2.6 billion dollars.
Assuming a seven percent interest rate, the yearly interest
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alone on these projects would be $420 million and $182 million
respectively. In contrast,, the gross income (i.e., not
deducting operating expenses) of the canal in 1981 was $383
million. (Ref. 20:p. 68; Ref. 49)
2. Economic Alternatives
Economic alternatives to the canal exist, and if
these alternatives were further developed, then trade might
be diverted away from the canal and its value thus decreased.
These alternatives include railroads, supertankers (i.e.,
vessels too large for the canal) and the development of
alternate markets and sources.
In the late 1970' s, it cost $783 to move a standard
size shipping container by rail from the U.S. East Coast to
the West Coast or $715 to move the same container by water
via the canal. The critical difference which favored
railroads over the canal was the transit time: six days
by rail versus 14-15 days by water. In 1977 the U.S. rail
system was only at 40% capacity and thus could absorb all
non-bulk cargo then being shipped through the canal. (Ref.
50:p. 189)
In contrast, bulk cargo presents serious problems
for using railroads instead of the canal. While one U.S.
economist, Ely Brandes, believed that U.S. railroads could
be used to ship grain and lumber that was being shipped
through the canal (Ref. 50:pp. 350-351)* other analysts
point to significant problems with this solution. Paul
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Ryan, the author of The Panama Canal Controversy , has stated
that the grain from the U.S. Midwest could be shipped to such
ports as Portland and Seattle by a combination of railroads
and trucks and then sent to the Far East via merchant vessel.
However, it would take about five years to develop the
necessary U.S. rail and port facilities (Ref. 15:p. 93). In
testimony before Congress in 1977> James W. Boone, Director
of the Federal Railroad Administration's Office of Rail
Economics and Operations, reiterated this theme. Boone
noted that limits in port facilities restricted the railroads'
ability to absorb the canal's grain trade. For example, the
West Coast has only k0% of the grain storage facilities
available at the Gulf and Atlantic ports. Furthermore,
increased transportation costs if shipped by rail could mean
the loss of the U.S. wheat producers' comparative advantage,
in the international grain trade, to foreign wheat producers.
Likewise, lack of West Coast coal-handling facilities and
substantial increases in transportation costs prevent
railroads from absorbing the canal's trade in metallurgical
coal. (Ref. 20:pp. 107-109)
Developing these facilities would, however, be a
direct benefit to the U.S. economy. This fact led U.S.
economist Stephen Gibbs to observe "the possibility cannot
be ruled out that the United States might actually be
better off in an aggregate, economic sense by closing the
canal." (Ref. 20:p. 271) Furthermore, it is interesting
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to note that the 1985 canal grain trade decreased in volume
as a result of "very low rail rates" to U.S. West Coast
ports (Ref. 51).
Like the land alternatives, sea alternatives to the
Panama Canal are already in use. Forty percent of the U.S.
foreign coal trade presently bypasses the canal. For example,
large multipurpose commodity carriers (in excess of 100,000
tons) pick up coal from Norfolk, transit to Brazil for a
load of iron ore, complete their load with oil from Nigeria
and then sail around the Cape of Good Hope to Japan.
Shippers have found it cheaper to transport coal this way
than with smaller ships through the canal, even though the
canal trip takes only 27 days instead of 38 days. Likewise,
super merchant-carriers might be able to absorb the canal's
trade in grain, phosphates, iron ore and petroleum. (Ref.
15:p. 83; Ref. 20:pp. 107-109; Ref. 50:pp. 350-351)
Finally, with regard to economic alternatives to the
canal, if the Panama Canal were to be closed, then several
existing trades might become too expensive to be economically
feasible. On the other hand, it is estimated that upon
closure, approximately 4 0% of the trade could promptly shift
to new markets and sources and thus bypass the canal. Studies
indicate that there are probably alternate markets and sources
for the present canal trade in sugar, lumber and paper products,
ores and concentrates, fertilizers and petroleum products.
(Ref. 20:p. 47; Ref. 50:pp. 350-352)
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In contrast to the existence of economic alternatives
to the canal, there does not appear to be good military
alternatives to Panama as a line of communication. If the
canal ceased to exist, the U.S. would incur two military
costs: first, it would lose one line of communication for
supporting its forces overseas, and second, in order to
transfer its naval or merchant ships from one ocean to
another, it would have to send these ships around Cape Horn.
As previously mentioned, U.S. economists indicate
that in the long-run there are numerous economic and
transportation alternatives to the canal. In the long run,
these commercial alternatives could also provide alternate
military lines of communication. Nonetheless, even when
these alternatives were developed, the only way to transfer
ships between the oceans, whether naval or commercial, would
be to send them around Cape Horn. Sending ships around
Cape Horn during wartime poses a serious problem: they
would have to be defended. Extending our maritime defenses
to cover the 8,000 mile detour around South America could
prove to be a difficult task in wartime. Furthermore, the
detour would greatly increase the time required to reinforce
the U.S. fleets in either ocean.
3. Canal Service
In addition to the development of alternatives to
the canal, a deterioration in the efficiency of the canal
could impair its value. A key issue is whether the Panamanians
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will be able to operate the canal after the year 2000. In
October of 1919) pursuant to the Panama Canal Treaty, the
U.S. transferred the Panama Railway to Panama. By 1982 the
railway service had deteriorated to such an extent that
canal employees who used it to go to work were frequently
late because of delays in the railroad. Panamanian officials
sought a subsidy from the U.S. in order to improve the
quality of the service (Ref. 52). It is impossible to
predict now whether the operation of the canal after the
year 2000 will or will not deteriorate in the same way that
the operation of the railroad deteriorated after 1979.
B. FUTURE COSTS
The future costs of the canal to the United States will
depend heavily on the degree of cooperation between the U.S.
and Panama. Arguably, the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty and the
1977 Neutrality Treaty will greatly reduce the U.S. costs.
The transfer of the control of the canal will eliminate the
anti-U.S. sentiment within Panama and the transfer of the
local defense responsibility to Panama will reduce the U.S.
cost of defense. While the Panama Canal Treaty thus reduces
the U.S. costs, the Neutrality Treaty will guarantee U.S.
access to the canal. On the other hand, it can also be argued
that the future costs will likely escalate. The experience
with the Panama Railway demonstrates that the U.S. will have
to subsidize an inefficient Panamanian operations if the canal
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is to continue to operate. Furthermore, a conflict between
the U.S. and Panama in the* interpretation of the Neutrality
Treaty will heighten the political conflict between the two
nations after the year 2000.
How to interpret the Neutrality Treaty is a potentially
serious issue. With regard to a clear-cut attack by a
third party on the canal, there does not seem to be any
disagreement ss the U.S. right and responsibility to come
to Panama's assistance (Ref. 19:pp. 525-526; Ref. 53).
Nonetheless, serious problems in the interpretation of the
treaty do exist. During the Congressional hearings on the
1977 treaties, the U.S. Department of Defense made it clear
that it interpreted the 1977 Neutrality Treaty to mean that
after the year 2000 the U.S. will have the right to determine
unilaterally whether the canal's security is at risk and then
to reintroduce U.S. troops into Panama if it thus deems it
necessary (Ref. ll:p. 162; Ref. 21:pp. 244-245). This
liberal interpretation of U.S. rights under the Neutrality
Treaty appears to conflict with Panamanian expectations
concerning the nature of the U.S. -Panamanian relationship
after the year 2000. The Panamanians are wary that the
right of the U.S. to defend the canal from third party attacks
might become a pretext for U.S. intervention in Panamanian
domestic affairs.
On the other hand, Panamanians may attempt liberally to
interpret the meaning of the canal's neutrality so as to thwart
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the U.S. right to use and to defend the canal. In 1984
Panamanian Vice-President Jorge Illueca stated that the
security of the canal was based on its neutrality, instead
of on military considerations (Ref. 5*0. That same year,
Foreign Minister Oyden Ortega stated that the canal's
best defense was its neutrality and the universality of its
services (Ref. 55). This position, if pushed to an extreme,
could conflict with U.S. expectations for access to the
canal. In his 1984 statement, Vice-President Illueca stated
"to the extent of our abilities we will never allow the
Panama Canal to serve military ends or purposes." (Ref. 5*0
Arguably, permitting a U.S. warship or U.S. vessel to use
the canal while the vessel is on a wartime mission could
be construed as a violation of the canal's neutrality. The
U.S. tried to foreclose this argument in the 1977 Neutrality
Treaty by providing, in Article IV, that U.S. "warships and
auxilliary vessels have the right to transit the canal
expeditiously "irrespective of their internal operation, means
of propulsion, origin, destination, armament or cargo carried."
Whether this provision will go without challenge, amendment
or qualification remains to be seen.
The defense of the canal becomes much more costly, both
politically and militarily, if an attack is conducted or
supported by a faction within Panama. The Panamanians, given
their history, are adamantly opposed to U.S. intervention in
Panamanian internal affairs. In his 1984 statement, Vice
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President Illueca cited a U.S. legal authority for "the
crystal-clear conclusion that if the United States were
to take military action to keep the canal open, such
military action could not be directed against Panama's
territorial integrity." (Ref. 54) But the issue is not
always crystal clear. If a terrorist force did attack the
canal but claimed to be Panamanian in origin, then U.S.
defense of the canal could appear to be intervention to
maintain the status quo Panamanian government. On the
other hand, the U.S. might not wish to permit a Panamanian
civil war to destory the canal and deprive the U.S. of its
access to the canal under the Neutrality Treaty.
Thus, it is possible that the future military and
political costs of the canal to the U.S. will increase.
Unquestionably, it is easier for the U.S. to defend the
canal if it has forces and bases within Panama, but the
Panama Canal Treaty mandates the withdrawal of these forces
by December 31, 1999. While this withdrawal will bring the
U.S. political gains, the potential conflict over the
Neutrality Treaty could eliminate these gains. If the U.S.
unilaterally Inserts military forces into Panama to improve
the defense of the canal, the political backlash would be
tremendous. Not only would it appear that the U.S. was
continuing a colonial policy in Latin America, it would
appear that the U.S. was willing to violate a treaty, i.e.,
the Panama Canal Treaty, in order to pursue this policy.
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In such an event, the cost of defending U.S. interests in the
canal would be even greater than they were before the
ratification of the 1977 treaties.
C. CONCLUSION
The only way to minimize these costs, if possible at all,
is to build a relationship with Panama that will provide the
U.S. with the necessary use of the canal, provide the canal
with the necessary great power support to defend and to
maintain it and to provide the Panamanians with the necessary
sense of independence and sovereignty. Both nations value
the canal, and each nation needs the cooperation of the other
in order to maximize this value. For the U.S., it must continue
to support Panama while refraining from excessive interference.
Since the distinction between support and interference is
extremely subjective, the U.S. must work with' the Panamanians
to reach a mutually acceptable definition. The present U.S.
policy of not implementing measures against Noriega without
the request of Delvalle is a good example of such cooperation.
For Panama, it must seek to establish a government with
long term stability. Without such stability, it will be
unable to operate the canal and unable to form a partnership
with the U.S. With the pending departure of the U.S. troops
and canal workers by the year 2000, the Panamanians must
seek some other basis for national identity and unity other
than opposition to the U.S. presence.
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With regard to the formulation of U.S. war plans, this
study recommends that strategic planners should assume that
the canal will be available to the U.S. during wartime until
the year 2000. Historically, the U.S. has been able to keep
the canal open during both major wars such as the Second
World War and minor wars such as the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
In all wars, the- canal has been very useful for transferring
naval units between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and for
resupplying our forces overseas. With the exception of the
Second World War, this availability of the canal has been
maintained without a major reinforcement of the 10,000 troops
which the U.S. maintains in Panama. In the Second World War,
the garrison was increased to about 45,000 by 19^3* but was
thereafter rapidly decreased as the threat to the Western
Hemisphere dwindled. These forces were never frontline troops,
and, even then, were ultimately considered excessive given
the limited threat which materialized. Other than an
expanded demand for the defense of shipping, the primary
threat to the canal was sabotage—a threat which the Depart-
ment of Defense has estimated can be countered by the forces
already in Panama.
Admittedly, if the threat escalates greatly above the
level of sabotage, the canal either will be closed or will
have to be reinforced. However, such an escalation before
the year 2000 does not seem likely. The canal is vulnerable
to nuclear attacks, but so are the vast majority of U.S.
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defense facilities. If a war goes nuclear at the outset and
destroys the canal, then the canal will not matter at that
time: the focus of the war will have already switched from
conventional forces (which the canal supports) to strategic
nuclear forces. The closure of the canal will not be
important under such circumstances.
On the other hand, if the threat escalates to the risk
of large commando raids or multi-division offensives, then
the U.S. forces in Panama will have to be reinforced
—
perhaps
by an additional 100,000 troops. However, this type of
threat is also unlikely before the year 2000. In order for
such an attack to become possible, large, hostile bases
would have to be established in close proximity to the
canal. While the argument could be made that Cuba or
Nicaragua already provide such bases, this threat does not
seem likely. Both countries would have to devote their
entire military to support such a large scale offensive,
which would mean risking their nation's existence for the
dubious objective of closing the canal. On the other hand,
if hostile bases were established near the canal and if
large scale offensive actions were being mounted against the
U.S. in the Caribbean, then the global balance of forces
will have dramatically shifted against the United States.
The U.S. would have to eliminate its overseas commitments
and defend against the threat which would then exist in the
Western Hemisphere—whatever the cost. Once these attacks
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were thwarted, the canal would prove to be a useful tool
for mounting U.S. offensives against the hostile bases.
However, it must be emphasized that neither a nuclear attack
nor a multi-division offensive against the canal is likely
before the year 2000. Thus, U.S. strategic planners should
assume that the canal will be available during wartime until
the year 2000 with only minor reinforcements.
In sharp contrast, planners should assume that after the
year 2000 the canal will not be available in wartime. Absent
an agreement extending our base rights in Panama after the
year 2000, the U.S. should not assume that the Panamanian
military will be able to defend the canal and limit damage
in the event of an attack. With the canal not available,
U.S. naval and maritime assets will be effectively splintered
for the first time since 1914. The U.S. will either have
to fight its wars with the naval and maritime assets already
assigned to the particular ocean of conflict or the U.S.
will have to expand the number of its naval and merchant
assets to cover the 8,000 mile detour around Cape Horn.
Either way, the capability of existing maritime assets will
face greater burdens after the year 2000. Accordingly, if
no new base agreement is obtained, the U.S. will either have
to increase its maritime assets merely to match the existing
capability or it will have to reduce its overseas commitments
in order to reflect the decreased wartime capability.
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At this point in history, the Panama Canal's value,
economic cost and military value are all stable and will
likely continue to be so until the year 2000. The greatest
variable at the moment for the United States is the canal's
political cost. The Panama Canal Treaty aspired to
minimize these costs by establishing a symbiotic partnership
between the United States and Panama starting in the year
2000. Now that the United States has committed itself to
such a partnership, the best policy is to strive to work
with the Panamanians to ensure that the partnership succeeds
If the partnership degenerates into hostility after the
year 2000, then the Panama Canal Treaty will have failed.
However, even then, the potential value of the canal will
endure. It will then be the responsibility of a future U.S.
leader to seek a new way to minimize the canal's costs in
order to realize its strategic value as a component of U.S.
Sea Power.
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